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The Right to a Mechanic's Lien in Ohio:
A Survey
A MECHANIC'S LIEN is a "claim created by law for the purpose
of securing a priority of payment of the price and value of work
performed and materials furnished in erecting or repairing a building
or other structure, and as such it attaches to the land as well as the
buildings erected thereon."1  There was no common law lien on
realty equivalent to that on personalty,' thus leaving a builder or
supplier without security to insure payment for his efforts. The
right to a lien on the realty for work done thereon has been created
entirely by statute, and the character, operation, and extent of the
lien right must be ascertained solely from the statute which creates
and defines it.4 The remedy, however, is not exclusively legal but
rather is said to rest upon broad principles of equity.' The statutes
conferring the lien right have been considered to be founded upon
the equitable principle at common law which gave to every bailee
for hire a lien upon the bailed goods for the reasonable value of his
labor and skill which imparted additional value to those goods.6
This Note is directed toward an inspection of the basic right to a
mechanic's lien and of the statutory requirements with which the
lienor must comply in order to perfect that right. Although the
underlying purpose of the mechanic's lien is to protect the principal
lVan Stone v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 142 U.S. 128, 136 (1891).
2 Building materials, being personalty, became part of the realty when attached
thereto. Park v. Williamson Heater Co., 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 150, 158 (C.P. 1917),
aff'd, 35 Ohio C.C. Dec. 517 (1918).
3 Mahoning Park Co. v. Warren Home Dev. Co., 109 Ohio St. 358, 364, 142 N.E.
883, 885 (1924).
4 Black River Lumber Co. v. Kent, 124 Ohio St. 20, 22, 176 N.E. 662, 663 (1931).
5 Eggar v. Corwin, 8 Ohio App. 313, 326 (1917); Paik v. Williamson Heater Co.,
20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 150, 159 (C.P. 1917), afd, 35 Ohio CC. Dec. 517 (1918).
6 See Thomas v. Huesman, 10 Ohio St. 152 (1859). The reader should note that a
mechanic's lien statute is not analogous to either the particular lien of an artisan, which
is a bare right to hold the chattel until payment, or to the general lien known to the
common law which secured a general balance of accounts. Further, a mechanic's lien,
which affects only the property on which the work is done, obviously differs from a judg-
ment lien, which affects all of the debtor's property subject to the lien. See generally
PHILLIPS, MECHANICS' LIENS § 10 (2d ed. 1883).
7 For a comprehensive analysis of the entire Ohio Mechanic's Lien Law, see DE-
mANN, THE OHIO MECHANIC'S IEN LAw (1953, Supp. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
DM&ANN]; DEWrrr, THE OHIO LAW OF MECHANICS LIENS AND LABORER'S PREF-
ERENcEs (1931, Holmes Stipp. 1950) [hereinafter cited as DEWITr; KNEPPER &
RICHARDS, THE OHIO MANUAL OF GENERAL PRAcnCE § 20 (1956); 36 OHIO JUL.
2D Mechanics' Liens (1959, Supp. 1966). For a general survey on mechanics' liens, see
PHL.LIPs, op. cit. supra note 6, 5§ 1-512; ROCKEL, MECHANICS' LIENS (1909).
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contractors from default by the owner and to protect the subcon-
tractors, materialmen, and laborers from default by the principal
contractor, it must be kept in mind that the burden of compliance
rests upon the party seeking to invoke the benefit of the statute. A
qualified right is thus created, and, in this sense, the owner receives
the incidental benefit of knowing the absolute extent of his liability.
An understanding of the Mechanic's Lien Law8 is important in order
to perfect and protect the respective rights of lienors and owners
alike.
I. ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF MECHANICS' LIENS
The need to grant mechanics and materialmen the right to a
lien upon the land and the buildings erected thereon was recognized
as early as 1791, when the General Assembly of Maryland, in re-
sponse to the recommendations of James Madison and Thomas Jef-
ferson, enacted the first mechanic's lien statute in order to expedite
the construction of Washington, D.C.' The benefit of the statute
was thus directed toward the builders and artisans whose skills were
so important to the development of our early economy. It was
necessary to provide some degree of security to insure payment for
the work performed and to dispel anxieties about the landowners'
credit.
The first similar legislation in Ohio was enacted by the city of
Cincinnati in 182310 and was followed by the adoption of a general
Mechanic's Lien Law in 1843." However, the statute, as enacted,
granted a lien upon the real property to only those persons who
performed labor or furnished materials under or by virtue of a con-
tract with the owner or his authorized agent. Under the Act
of 1894,1" this right was extended to include laborers, materialmen,
and subcontractors. The elimination of any privity requirement
immediately rendered the act subject to question, and it was there-
after found unconstitutional as a misappropriation of the owner's
8 O-io REV. CODE ch. 1311.
9 PHILLIPS, op. cit. supra note 6, § 7, at 12. See also Park v. Williamson Heater
Co., 20 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 150, 158 (C.P. 1917), aff'd, 35 Ohio C.C. Dec. 517 (1918).
10 21 Ohio Laws 8. In 1833 (31 Ohio Laws 88) and in 1840 (38 Ohio Laws 115),
the territorial operation and effect of the legislation was extended to encompass sur-
rounding counties. See also 36 OHIO JtrR. 2D Mechanics' Liens § 5 (1959).
1141 Ohio Laws 66.
12 91 Ohio Laws 135.
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property."3 The ensuing public pressure and judicial inconsistency' 4
led to an amendment of the Ohio Constitution in 1912 giving the
legislature power to establish mechanic's lien laws." Pursuant to
its newly founded constitutional authority, the legislature passed such
laws in 19131" and in 1915."7 All doubt has since been removed as
to the constitutional validity of giving a direct right against property
to one not in privity with the owner thereof' s or of conferring un-
limited authority upon the General Assembly to legislate concerning
mechanics' liens.'"
The simple right initially granted to the small builder in a mod-
est economic environment still exists today in the basic Mechanic's
Lien Law, as embodied in sections 1311.01 to 1311.37 of the Ohio
Revised Code. While the purpose of the mechanic's lien remains
unchanged, the scope of the right has been altered to satisfy mod-
ern needs. The simple right has become far more complex and
has been extended to include mine workers," workers under public
construction contracts,"' subcontractors," and laborers2 8 In addi-
tion, specific lien rights are conferred upon railroads,24 animals,
25
and public works." The following discussion is intended to explain
in a more detailed fashion the complex statutory requirements which
must be understood and followed in Ohio in order to establish the
"simple" right to a mechanic's lien.27
13 Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 NE. 313 (1896).
14 See Great So. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U.S. 532 (1904). The Supreme
Court of the United States, exercising its independent judgment as to constitutionality,
found the statute did not deprive the owner of his property without due process of law
nor interfere with his liberty to contract. Id. at 549-50. See generally DEWITT § 5.
15 OHIo CONsT. art. II, § 33.
Laws may be passed to secure to mechanics, artisians, laborers, sub-contractors
and materialmen, their just dues by direct lien upon the property, upon which
they have bestowed labor or for which they have furnished material. No other
provision of the constitution shall impair or limit this power. Ibid.
16 103 Ohio Laws 369-79.
17 105 Ohio Laws 522-34.
18 Chapel State Theatre Co. v. Hooper, 123 Ohio St. 322, 175 N.E. 450, aff'd per
curim, 284 U.S. 588 (1931).
19 West Side Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Lancaster Paper Mill Co., 5 Ohio App. 253
(1915).20 Omo REV. CODE 5 1311.25.
21 OFHO REV. CODE 55 1311.26-.29.
2 2 Omo REv. CODE § 1311.33.
2 3 OHo REV. CODE §§ 1311.34-.37.
24 OHo REV. CODE §§ 1311.39-.47.
25 OHIo REv. CODE §§- 1311.48-.51.
2 6 Omo REv. CODE §§ 1311.65.68.
27 A discussion of the scope of the right is not attempted here. If questions arise in
this area, one must look to the pertinent statute creating the right involved.
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II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Since a mechanic's lien is a creature of statute, the courts will
apply the general rules of statutory construction in determining and
defining the rights, procedures, and remedies created by that stat-
ute. 8 The cases, however, reveal a conflict as to the proper rule to
be applied. Some courts have interpreted the mechanic's lien stat-
utes as creating no new substantive rights but rather as being re-
medial in character and have thus applied a rule of liberal construc-
tion.29 However, the application of a conflicting rule, that laws in
derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed, has led to
a contrary interpretation." In attempting to resolve this conflict,
the Mechanic's Lien Act of 1913 provided that a rule of liberal con-
struction should be applied "to secure the beneficial results, intents,
and purposes thereof."'
Although it would seem that the courts should apply an equally
liberal interpretation to those sections of the statute concerned with
the creation or acquisition of the lien as well as to those sections con-
cerned with the rights and remedies thereunder, such has not been
the case. 2 Notwithstanding the clear intent of the statute, the
courts have adopted their own rule of construction. Thus, the stat-
utory requirements are strictly construed when involved with ques-
tions regarding whether a lien attaches or whether there has been
compliance with the steps necessary to perfect the lien."3 After the
existence of a lien has been determined, the statutes are liberally in-
terpreted insofar as they are remedial or concern errors of
procedure.3 4
Though this distinction may seem confused and subject to criti-
2 8 Black River Lumber Co. v. Kent, 124 Ohio St. 20, 176 N.E. 662 (1931); Mahon-
ing Park Co. v. Warren Home Dev. Co., 109 Ohio St. 358, 142 N.E. 883 (1924).
29Mack v. DeGraff & Roberts Quarries, 57 Ohio St. 463, 49 N.E. 697 (1898);
Bullock v. Horn, 44 Ohio St. 420, 7 N.E. 737 (1886).
30 In the Matter of Kinnane Co., 14 OHIo L. RrP. 531 (S.D. Ohio 1916).
31 Omo REv. CODE § 1311.24.
32 See DEWrr § § 9-10.
33 Manpower, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 Ohio St. 45, 179 N.E.2d 922 (1962); Love Lum-
ber Co. v. Reaser, 4 Ohio App. 2d 354, 212 N.E.2d 655 (1964); Union Say. Bldg. &
Loan Co. v. Amburgy, 108 Ohio App. 82, 155 N.E.2d 518 (1958); F. W. Winstel Co.
v. Johnston, 103 Ohio App. 525, 143 N.E.2d 730 (1957). But see State v. Kauer, 116
Ohio App. 412, 188 N.E.2d 434 (1960), which required "substantial compliance" with
the statutory procedure.
-
3 4 See Robert V. Clapp Co. v. Fox, 124 Ohio St. 331, 178 N.E. 586 (1931); C. C.
Constance & Sons v. Lay, 122 Ohio St. 468, 172 N.E. 283 (1930); Vitale Bros. Co. v.
Wurtz, 2 Ohio App. 2d 99, 206 N.E.2d 585 (1965).
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cism,85 the pitfalls can be avoided by scrutinizing the statutes and
complying with all requirements. It must be remembered that the
requirements hereinafter referred to in perfecting the lien are man-
datory; thus, a failure in compliance will preclude establishment of
the lien.
III. RIGHT TO A LIEN
A. Persons Entitled to a Lien
The basic Ohio statute " provides that any person or corporation,
any subcontractor, laborer, or materialman of an original contractor,
or any subcontractor who, under contract, performs labor or fur-
nishes machinery, materials, or fuel for the construction, alteration,
or repair of a building or improvement is entitled- to a mechanic's
lien. The breadth of the right, limited to the parties designated, de-
pends upon statutory definition 7 as well as judicial interpretation."
Although the statute entitles a corporation as well as a person
to a lien, it is a right qualified by applicable state corporate statutes.
Thus, if the issue arises, a lien-claimant corporation must show that
it is qualified to do business in Ohio 9 and, if it is a foreign corpora-
tion, that it is properly licensed within the state."°
More difficult problems of interpretation are presented where a
specific or professional service is rendered. Thus, architects, sur-
veyors, engineers, attorneys, and abstractors do not perform "labor"
and will generally be denied the right to a lien' Liens of archi-
35 See Gebhart v. United States, 172 Ohio St. 200, 174 N.E.2d 615 (1961), wherein
the court questioned the accuracy and applicability of such a distinction.
36 01ao REV. CODE § 1311.02.
37 OHIo REV. CODE § 1311.01(B) defines "Materialman" as "all persons by
whom any machinery, materials, or fuel are furnished .... " OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.01
(C) defines "Laborer" as "any mechanic, workman, artisan, or laborer employed in or
about any such work." OHIo REV. CODE § 1311.01 (D) defines "Subcontractor" as
"any person who undertakes to construct, alter, erect, improve, repair, remove, dig,
or drill ... under a contract with any person other than the owner."
38 While it is dear that a materialman of a subcontractor is within the statutory
class, the right of a materialman's materialman to a lien has generally been denied.
Botzum Bros. Co. v. Brown Lumber Co., 104 Ohio App. 507, 150 N.E.2d 485 (1957);
Ivorydale Lumber Co. v. Cincinnati Union Terminal Co., 45 Ohio App. 353, 187 N.E.
126 (1933). But see Alsco, Inc. v. Mundey, 110 Ohio App. 446, 169 NXE.2d 556
(1959).
39 Dabney v. Rose Bros. Co., 47 Ohio App. 278, 191 N.E. 810 (1933).
-10 Manhattan Terrazzo Brass Strip Co. v. A. Benzing & Sons, 72 Ohio App. 116,
50 NYE.2d 570 (1943).
41 Robert V. Clapp Co. v. Fox, 124 Ohio St. 331, 178 N.E. 586 (1931).
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tects"2 and surveyors43 have been upheld, however, where it was
shown that the work performed went beyond the mere preparation
of plans at a place divorced from the site of construction and in-
volved the actual supervision of work. The rationale for these
holdings is that the right to a lien is dependent upon the severability
of the contract and only attaches as security for the work done at
the site.
B. Labor Performed and Materials Furnished
The Ohio Mechanic's Lien statute enables a specific class of
creditor to elevate himself to the preferred class of lienor.4" To do
so, the party claiming such preference must affirmatively show that
he has performed labor or furnished materials. Thus, a lien can be
acquired for work or labor upon, or machinery, material, or fuel fur-
nished for, watercraft, buildings, bridges, wells (other than those for
gas and oil), and landscaping.45 A similar lien can be obtained upon
gas and oil wells,4" and a lien can also arise from the private con-
struction or repair of streets, sidewalks, and ditches.4" Moreover, as
previously mentioned,4 liens are given for specific work performed
and for materials furnished.
(1) Performing Work or Labor.-The statute provides a right
of lien to "every person or corporation who performs work or labor
upon" a structure.49 Originally, this was interpreted as requiring a
direct and immediate visible enhancement in the value of the prop-
42 Stark v. McConnell, 22 Ohio Op. 123 (C.P. 1940).
4 3 Kline v. Federal Ins. Co., 152 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
44 OMo REV. CODE § 1311.13.
4 5 OHO REV. CODE § 1311.02 provides a lien right for
constructing, altering, or repairing watercraft, or for erecting, altering, re-
pairing, or removing a house, mill, manufactory, or any furnace or furnace
material therein, or other building, appurtenance, fixture, bridge, or other
structure, or gas pipe line, or well other than a well drilled or constructed
for the production of oil or gas, or who furnishes tile for the drainage of
any lot or land, or who does work or labor or furnishes material for the
improvement, enhancement, or embellishment of real property by seeding,
sodding, or the planting thereon of any shrubs, roses, trees, plants, vines,
small fruits, flowers, or nursery stocks of any kind, or by grading, or filling
to establish a grade ....
46 OmO REv. CODE § 1311.021 provides a lien right for "digging, drilling,
boring, operating, completing, or repairing any well drilled or constructed for the
production of oil or gas, or for altering, repairing, or constructing any oil derrick, oil
tank, or leasehold production pipe line ...."
47 OHio REv. CODE § 1311.03 provides a lien right for "construction, alteration,
or repair of any street, turnpike, road, sidewalk, way, drain, ditch, or sewer ....
48 See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
49 OMo REV. CODE § 1311.02.
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erty. ° The attachment-to-the-realty concept is no longer absolute,
the courts having noted a distinction between a lien for work and
labor "upon" a building, and the furnishing of machinery, materials,
or fuel "for" a given structure. Thus, it is required that work or
labor be rendered either "upon" the structure or "upon" the prem-
ises where the structure is being erected. The furnishing "for"
clause, however, requires only that the material be suitable and
necessary to the purpose, requirement, or character of the building.51
Applying this distinction, one may have a mechanic's lien for labor
performed in hauling to the site items which will later become a part
of the building. 2 As a general rule, therefore, the term "labor" is
used in its ordinary sense and implies the personal work of an
individual."m
(2) Furnishing Machinery, Material, or Fuel.-The rationale
for a mechanic's lien is ,that one who enhances the value of real
property by furnishing materials should have security for the value
of such materials. The question presented then becomes: When are
the goods furnished such that the supplying party is entitled to a
security interest? This question has been characterized as one of
passage of title, as where the ownership and right to possession have
passed from the lien claimant to the owner or principal contractor.'
It has also been characterized by reference to whether the delivery
has been made in accordance with the terms of the contract.55 Nei-
ther delivery alone nor use of the materials in the structure are suffi-
cient in themselves to give rise to a lien right.5"
In order to meet the furnishing requirement, it must be shown
that the goods were ordered for purposes of construction and that
they were delivered in good faith, under the premise that the goods
were needed for the structure.57 At the time that the goods are sold,
therefore, it is not necessary that there be an understanding that the
5 0 See DBMANN § 6.1.
51 Robert V. Clapp Co. v. Fox, 124 Ohio St. 331, 337, 178 N.E. 586, 588 (1931).
This case was followed in Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Birzer Bldg. Co., 101 N.E.2d
408 (Ohio C.P. 1950).
52 Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v. Portsmouth Ice, Coal & Bldg. Material Co.,
122 Ohio St. 439, 172 N.E. 152 (1930).
53 Manpower, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 Ohio St. 45, 179 N.E.2d 922 (1962).
5 4 Franklin Bank v. City of Cincinnati, 8 Ohio N.P. 517 (1900). See also Con-
necticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Birzer Bldg. Co., 101 N.E.2d 408 (Ohio C.P. 1950).
55 King, Gilbert & Warner v. Ship Bldg. Co., 50 Ohio St. 320, 34 N.E. 436 (1893).
5 5 See DHEM § 6.1.
57 Quality Heating Supply Co. v. Buckeye Loan & Bldg. Co., 105 Ohio App.
369, 148 N._.2d 88 (1957).
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material will be used in the structure, because a lien attaches when
material is "furnished" and not when it is "used." Similarly, a
materialman who in good faith delivers materials to a building site
may claim a lien for the value of those materials despite the fact that
they are subsequently used at another site. 8
The problem of defining "materials" has largely been avoided
in Ohio through specific statutory provision. It is provided that
lubricants and other petroleum products, dynamite and other
explosives, and hauling and delivery machinery are materials
which may be the subject of a lien. 9 Notwithstanding the dear
statutory language, the courts have been required to determine cer-
tain questions regarding materials. Thus, where tools remain un-
used on a particular job but can be used for other jobs, they are still
considered the personal property of the contractor and, not being
used within the contract, cannot be subject to a lien.6" The right to
claim a lien for extras6 will depend upon the individual situation
and the applicable contractual provisions. There can be no claim
for work done to complete the contract, however unforeseeable that
work may have been. But where the extra work is authorized, the
right to a lien attaches to the original contract and is not a separate
lien right.6
C. The Contract
The mechanic's lien statute requires that the claim for which a
lien is allowed must arise "by virtue of a contract, express or im-
plied, with the owner, part owner, or lessee of any interest in real
estate, or his authorized agent."68  The statute and its predecessors
require, as a precondition to the perfection and existence of a lien,
that there be a valid contract such that a debtor-creditor relationship
exists between the owner and the contractor.6" Since proof of a con-
58 East End Lumber Co. v. Bennett, 46 Ohio App. 104, 187 N.E. 786 (1933);
Constance Lumber Co. v. Gatton, 11 Ohio L. Abs. 97 (Ct. App. 1931).
59 0mo RBV. CODE § 1311.27.
60 See Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v. Portsmouth Ice, Coal & Bldg. Material
Co., 122 Ohio St. 439, 172 N.E. 152 (1930).
6 1 An extra is something furnished in addition to or in excess of the contractual
requirements.
62 D~mAN § 6.18.
6 8 OMO R V. CODE § 1311.02.
6 4 Benes v. United States, 276 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1960); Mahoning Park Co. v.
Warren Home Dev. Co., 109 Ohio St. 358, 142 N.E. 883 (1924); Choteau v. Thomp-
son, 2 Ohio St. 114 (1853); Price Bros. Co. v. Walters, 115 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1951).
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tract is thus vital to establish the right to a lien, it follows that no
lien can arise out of work done by a mere volunteer " or from that
which is done gratuitously.6
Interpretation of the contract which forms the basis for a lien is
governed by the general rules of contract law. Thus, an express
contract is proved by production of the document which incorpo-
rates the agreed terms of the parties.6" An implied contract is
proved when the terms may be inferred from the evidence offered
as a matter of fact, not of law, making it reasonable from the sur-
rounding circumstances to infer that a contract did exist."
The problem of determining who is an owner, part owner, or
lessee within the statute for contractual purposes is lessened by stat-
utory definition, which includes all legal or equitable interests in real
estate upon which work is to be done and particularly includes the
interests of a purchaser. 9 As to what constitutes an "authorized
agent," reference is made to the ordinary rules of agency. However,
it is specificially provided that the husband is the authorized agent
of a wife who owns property."0
IV. PERFECTING THE LIEN
Because a mechanic's lien exists solely by virtue of statute, all of
the procedural requirements must be met before an enforceable lien
is created. The two basic requirements to be discussed in detail are,
first, the service of the sworn statements of the contractor and sub-
contractors on the owner and, second, the filing of an affidavit with
the county recorder. The lien is deemed to be perfected from the
time the last of these two requirements is performed, 1 as long as
both acts occur within sixty days from completion of performance1
It cannot be overemphasized that the procedure for perfecting a
mechanic's lien is mandatory, and in that respect the courts will
strictly construe the statutory requirements.
6 5 Choteau v. Thompson, supra note 64.
6 6 King, Gilbert & Warner v. Ship Bldg. Co., 50 Ohio St. 320, 34 N.E. 436 (1893).
67 21 OHIo JuR. 2D Evidence § 196 (1956).
6 8 Gebhart v. United States, 172 Ohio St. 200, 174 N.E.2d 615 (1961).
69 OHo REV. CODE § 1311.01(A).
70 OmIo REV. CODE § 1311.10. This provision only applies when the wife has
"knowledge" of the work and does not expressly object.
7136 OHIo JuR. 2D Mechanics' Liens 5 86 (1959).
72 Omo REV. CODE §5 1311.04, .06.
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A. Sworn Statement of Contractor and Subcontractors
It is provided that a statement under oath, which recites the
existence of a contract with the owner and the work or services per-
formed under that contract, shall be made by the contractor and
served upon the owner, part owner, lessee, mortgagee, or his agent
whenever: (1) any payment of money becomes due from such
owner; (2) the original contractor desires to draw any money under
his contract; or (3) any mortgagee makes a written demand.7
In considering the requirements which follow, it should be borne in
mind that the purpose of the statement is twofold. It not only pro-
tects the owner from liens which exceed the amount of his contract,
but it also prevents dealings between the principal contractor and
the owner which might prejudice the rights of the subcontractors,
laborers, or materialmen,74 assuring them payment unless the owner
protects himself by requiring the necessary statements at the time of
any payment to the principal contractor."
That such statements are mandatory and a condition precedent
to the perfection of a lien is evidenced by the denial of any lien or
right of action to a contractor or subcontractor until the statements
are made and furnished as provided.76 Thus, it is not mandatory
that a statement be furnished when money is paid, but it must be
made to establish a right to a lien.
(1) Form and Content of Statements.-The statement of the
contractor must include the name and address of every laborer, sub-
contractor, or person furnishing machinery, material, or fuel as
well as the amounts due or to become due." Similar sworn
statements are required from each subcontractor, both statements to
be accompanied by certificates signed by every person furnishing
machinery, material, or fuel. 8 A form to be used for the statements
and certificates is suggested in section 1311.04 and while compli-
ance with the statutory form7" is not absolutely required, a substan-
73 Omo REv. CODE § 1311.04.
74 Berea Block & Supply Co. v. Bridges, 178 N.E.2d 844 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
75 See B. A. M., Inc. v. McDonald, 5 Ohio App. 2d 166, 214 N.E.2d 267 (1965).
7 6 Oruo REV. CODE § 1311.04. See also Mahoning Park Co. v. Warren Home
Dev. Co., 109 Ohio St. 358, 142 N.E. 883 (1924) (decided under identical predecessor
to OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.04); Dealers Lumber & Coal Co. v. Peter A. Marchi, Inc.,
170 N.E.2d 257 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
7 7 Orno REv. CODE § 1311.04.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
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tial compliance is necessary. It should be noted that the mere send-
ing of a bill is not the furnishing of a statement."0
(2) Statement of the Contractor.-The contractor must file
such statements with the owner, part owner, or lessee within the
sixty days required by statute."1 The fact that all laborers and subcon-
tractors have been paid in full and no claims are outstanding cannot
justify the failure to furnish a statement.82 Compliance with the
statutory requirement cannot be waived by the owner nor avoided
by the contractor or subcontractor, nor does the failure of the owner
to ask for a statement constitute a waiver of the contractor's obliga-
tion.' While the primary obligation to furnish a statement may
not be waived, a written waiver of lien, release, or receipt may be
furnished in lieu of the certificate of a materialman.s Where the
contractor or subcontractor is unable to locate within the county the
owners or others upon whom service of a statement is required, he is
excused from fulfilling this requirement as a condition precedent to
perfecting a lien or instituting suit. 5 It is further provided that
where no liens are perfected within the sixty-day period, the failure
of the contractor to furnish a statement shall not be a bar or defense
in a suit to collect a claim."
(3) Statement of the Subcontractors.-The subcontractor has
the same rights and obligations under section 1311.04 of the Ohio
Revised Code and is subject to the same rules as those affecting the
contractor. The major distinction is that the subcontractor is
required to provide his statement only to the contractor unless other-
wise demanded by the owner.8"
(4) Demand by the Owner or Lien Claimant.-Since the statute
creates a right against the owner, part owner, or lessee, it also pro-
vides that such party may protect his interests and make written
demand upon the contractor or any subcontractor for the required
80 In the Matter of Don Evans, Inc., 157 N.E.2d 766 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959).
81 Oi-o RiV. CODE § 1311.04.
82 Ulmer v. Portage Constr. & Fin. Co., 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 257 (C.P. 1923),
aff'd without report, (Ohio Ct. App.), motion to certify overruled, 24 OHIo L. REP.
322 (1925) (decided under identical predecessor of OHIO REv. CODE § 1311.14); Ma-
honing Park Co. v. Warren Home Dev. Co., 109 Ohio St. 358, 142 N.E. 883 (1924).
83In the Matter of The Kinnane Co., 14 OHIO L. REP. 531 (S.D. Ohio 1916).
84 OHO REv. CODE § 1311.04.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87Ibid. Schuholz v. Walker, 111 Ohio St. 308, 145 N.E. 537 (1924); Ulmer v.
Portage Constr. & Fin. Co., 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 257 (C.P. 1923), aff'd without report,
(Ohio Ct. App.), motion to certify overruled, 24 OHIo L. REP. 322 (1925).
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statements at any time during the progress of the work.88 The fail-
ure to comply with such demand within ten days subjects the delin-
quent party to a liability of one hundred dollars in addition to the
actual damages arising from such refusal or neglect.8 9 The failure
may also result in the forfeiture of his right to a lien.9"
A reciprocal right of demand is created in the lien claimant
either to obtain the statements of contractors and subcontractors or
to be afforded an opportunity to make copies thereof. A failure to
comply within five days of such demand subjects the refusing party
to a liability of one hundred dollars plus the actual damages result-
ing from the neglect or refusal.9
(5) Payment by the Owner.-Any payments made before the
required statements are furnished or without the retention of suffi-
dent funds to make payment according to said statements and cer-
tificates are illegal and in violation of the rights of the parties in-
tended to be benefited. 2 The owner, part owner, or lessee must
bear all risk for any payments made during the sixty-day period fol-
lowing completion if the required statement has not been made.
Any payment made during that time will not be effective to de-
feat any lien of any subcontractor, materialman, or laborer. 3  How-
ever, where such parties participated in the distribution of funds,
their right to a lien will abate to the extent of such participation. 4
Payments made after receipt of the statements must be made ac-
cording to the respective rights of the parties as evidenced by such
statements and by the attached certificates. All payments so made to
such contractors, subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen are
treated as if made to the original contractor and the payor is released
from further liability to the extent of the payments made."
B. Affidavit for Lien
The second requirement with which every person seeking to at-
tain the status of a lienholder must comply is the making of an
8 8 0ino REV. CODE § 1311.04. The right of demand also extends to the con-
tractor seeking the statements of a subcontractor.
89 Ibid.
9 0 OHiO REv. CODE § 1311.12.
91 Ibid.
9 2 Omio REv. CODE § 1311.04.
9 3 OmO REv. CODE § 1311.05.
94 See Chapel State Theatre Co. v. Hooper, 123 Ohio St. 322, 175 N.E. 450, aff'd
per curiam, 284 U.S. 588 (1931); Quality Heating Supply Co. v. Buckeye Loan &
Bldg. Co., 105 Ohio App. 369, 148 N.E.2d 88 (1957).
9 5 Omo REv. CODE S 1311.04.
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affidavit for lien which recites that work was performed or materials
furnished at the owner's property and that payment is due and
owing. The affidavit must be entered into the public records by
filing with the county recorder in the county of performance."
(1) Form and Content.-The mandatory contents of such affi-
davit are set out by the statute." First, the affidavit must show the
amount due, but there is no statutory requirement to itemize 8 The
words "over and above all legal setoffs" after the stated amount are
essential to the validity of the lien, the omission of this phrase
being fatal. 9 The lien claimant is bound by the contents of the
affidavit, and, where the amount due is understated, the deficiency
may not later be supplied by evidence."' 0 However, if the affidavit
states an amount in excess of that found to be due on the contract,
the lien is not invalid in the absence of a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion.101
The second requirement is a description of the property to be
charged with the lien. As a general rule, the sufficiency of such de-
scription is a question of fact for the trial court and does not require
complete technical accuracy. The description necessary is one which
will enable a person familiar with the locality to identify the prop-
erty-.10
2
As a third requirement, the name and address of the person to
or for whom such material was furnished or labor performed is
required. In the case of an original contractor, this person would
be the owner, part owner, or lessee, while in the case of a subcontrac-
tor, materialman, or laborer, either the original contractor or a sub-
contractor would be named.0 3
Furnishing the name of the owner, part owner, or lessee, if
known, is the fourth requirement. If the name is not known to the
lien claimant, then the affidavit does not fail for either the omis-
06 Omo REv. CODE § 1311.06.
97Ibid.
98 Tinkey Lumber Co. v. Lay, 32 OHIo L REP. 392 (Ct. App. 1930). This applies
even though performance was at different times, if the work was done under a contract
for a fixed sum. Thomas v. Huesman, 10 Ohio St. 152 (1859).
99 C. C. Constance & Sons v. Lay, 122 Ohio St. 468, 172 N.E. 283 (1930).
100 Ibid.
101 Thomas v. Huesman, 10 Ohio St. 152 (1859). See Durrel Paint & Varnish
Co. v. Arnold, 105 Ohio App. 172, 152 NXE.2d 9 (1957), where the falsification in a
subcontractor's affidavit precluded a valid lien.
102 Grimm Iron Works Co. v. Frederick, 25 Ohio Op. 349 (C.P. 1941). See also
Shannon Co. v. Wurlitzer, 45 Ohio App. 194, 186 N- 879 (1932); Delskamp Paint
& Glass Co. v. Stotter, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 451 (C.P. 1931).
103 OHIO REv. CODE § 1311.06.
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sion or the mistaken identification of the owner. It obviously fol-
lows, however, that an intentional misrepresentation would defeat
the right to a lien.'" In the case of joint owners, a materialman is
not required to name both, but the naming of one owner subjects
only the interest of the party identified to the operation of the
lien.'0 5 The fifth and final requirement is the inclusion of the name
and address of the lien claimant.
Section 1311.06 of the Ohio Revised Code sets forth a form for
the affidavit which may be followed but which is not mandatory.'06
The affidavit will be considered sufficient so long as it provides the
information required by the statute.'0"
(2) Verification, Filing, and Recording.-"Such affidavit may
be verified before any person authorized to administer oaths,
whether attorney for the owner, lien claimant, or other party inter-
ested or not ... "18 The affidavit must be sworn to absolutely and
not upon information and belief,"0 9 but it is not required that the
affiant have personal knowledge of all the facts contained therein.
After the time for filing has expired, the affidavit may neither be
amended nor reformed in an equity action."0 Although a lien
claimant is bound by the contents of the affidavit as filed, there
should be no objection to the filing of a second corrected affidavit
within the statutory period."'
The affidavit must be filed within sixty days of the last perform-
ance of labor or furnishing of material." Although a statement
of the date of last performance is not one of the enumerated require-
ments, the suggested affidavit form provides for this date. More-
over, it has been determined that the inclusion of such a statement is
mandatory and essential to the lien's validity."'
104 DEWITT § 155.
105 Capital City Lumber Co. v. Eflerbrock, 177 Ohio St. 159, 203 N.E.2d 244
(1964).
106 Love Lumber Co. v. Reaser, 4 Ohio App. 2d 354, 212 N.E.2d 655 (1964).
0 7lBakos v. Lorain Lumber & Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio L. Abs. 147 (Ct. App. 1933).
108 OHIO REv. CODE § 1311.06.
109 See Gill v. Konvisser, 32 Ohio Ct. App. 542, 543 (1914). The stating of the
facts to be true "as he verily believes" was not sufficient.
110 Love Lumber Co. v. Reaser, 4 Ohio App. 2d 354, 212 N.E.2d 655 (1964);
State v. Kauer, 116 Ohio App. 412, 188 N.F-2d 434 (1960).
M DEWITr § 171.36. See 36 OHIO JuR. 2D Mechanics' Liens § 80 (1959).
11 2 OHIO REv. CODE § 1311.06. An exception is provided which allows the filing
of a lien upon gas and oil wells during a 120-day period. OHIO REv. CODE § 1311.021.
113 Ulmer v. Portage Constr. & Fin. Co., 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 257 (C.P. 1923),
aff'd without report, (Ohio Ct. App.), motion to certify overruled, 24 OHIO L REP.
322 (1925).
[Vol. 18: 297
MECHANICS' LIENS IN OHIO
The language of the statute requiring goods to be "furnished at
the building' does not require an actual delivery. Rather, a con-
structive delivery will be acceptable, under a liberal construction of
the meaning of "furnished.""' 4 The question then arises as to what
is a sufficient "furnishing" or "performance" from which to begin
the statutory period. Because additional labor and materials are
often required, the courts will carefully scrutinize such items to de-
termine whether they are a necessary incident of the contract and
performed in good faith or merely an attempt to extend time." 5 But
where there is a disagreement between the owner and the contractor
as to whether the contract has been fully performed, a materialman
who acts in good faith at the request of the contractor fixes a new
date of last delivery for the filing of his affida~vit." 8 The burden of
proof is upon the contractor to show performance within sixty days
prior to the filing of the affidavit for lien."7
No extension of the-filing time is allowed either for work done
voluntarily to cure a defective performance" or for furnishing small
items as afterthoughts."' Such actions are considered incidental to
the contract and necessary to completion of performance according
to its terms. Similarly, separate contracts cannot be tacked together
so as to extend the time for taking a lien.2 However, where the
ability to perform work according to the contract is suspended by the
owner, either expressly, by the owner's request,'2 ' or impliedly, by
abandonment"2 or through his affirmative act, 2 ' the time for filing
is extended. The contractor's abandonment or death, however, ter-
"14 To protect his right to a lien, it has been suggested that where there has been
no actual delivery the daimant should file his lien within sixty days from the date of
last delivery to the place specified in the contract. DBWITr § 157.
11 Walter v. Brothers, 42 Ohio App. 15, 181 N.E. 554 (1932). Work done at
the request of the owner and with his knowledge is generally sufficient to establish
a new period.
116 Quality Heating Supply Co. v. Buckeye Loan & Bldg. Co., 105 Ohio App. 369,
148 N.E.2d 88 (1957).
"17 Bakos v. Lorain Lumber & Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio L. Abs. 147 (Ct. App. 1933).
118 Walter v. Brothers, 42 Ohio App. 15, 181 NE. 554 (1932).
119 Bernard Lumber Co. v. Molinaro, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 21 (Ct. App. 1934).
120 King, Gilbert & Warner v. Ship Bldg. Co., 50 Ohio St. 320, 34 N.E. 436 (1893).
'
21 F. Pedretti & Sons v. Stichtenoth, 3 Ohio C.C. Dec. 564 (1892).
122 Groff v. Harris, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 101 (Cr App. 1934).
123 See Ulmer v. Portage Constr. & Fin. Co., 26 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 257 (C.P. 1923),
a!f'd without report, (Ohio Ct. App.), motion to certify overruled, 24 Omo L. REP.
322 (1925) in which appointment of a receiver suspended the filing period for a rea-
sonable time.
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minates all contractual relations, and the period for filing runs
from the date of last performance.'24
The recording of the affidavit must be effected in the county
where the labor was performed or the material furnished.'25 The
county recorder endorses the date and hour of filing upon the affi-
davit, recording the event in a lien register; the right to enforce the
lien then continues for six years. 28
(3) Notice and Service.-Within thirty days after filing, the
lien claimant must furnish notice by service of a copy of the affidavit
upon the owner, part owner, or lessee of the premises, or their
agents.-2 7  This requirement, as are all others, is mandatory, and
noncompliance will invalidate the lien."2 8 The problem of who is
the "owner" within the meaning of the statute has arisen where the
contracting owner has sold the property prior to the expiration of
the lien period. The early decisions placed liability upon the con-
tracting owner rather than the purchasing owner, because labor was
performed and materials furnished on the strength of the contract
and on the relationship with that owner.'29 The Ohio Supreme
Court has since determined, however, that service shall be made
upon the owner of the property at the time of service of the affi-
davit. 3 ' Thus, as between two innocent parties, the spirit of the
Mechanic's Lien Act prefers the laborer and places the burden of
investigation and knowledge of all claims upon the purchasing
owner. Where the owner is deceased at the time of notice, his execu-
tor or administrator accedes to all of his rights and liabilities.' 3'
The statutory requirement that the lien claimant "serve on the
owner" a copy of the affidavit has been interpreted to require per-
124 See DEMANN § 9.11.
125 OHIO REv. CODE 51311.06.
12 6 OMo REV. CODE § 1311.13.
127 OHIo REV. CODE 5 1311.07. However, an attorney employed for an action
pending in court is not an agent upon whom service may be made. Mahoning
Park Co. v. Warren Home Dev. Co., 109 Ohio St. 358, 142 N.E. 883 (1924).
128 Suburban Heating Co. v. Lougher, 4 Ohio App. 2d 343, 212 N.E.2d 659
(1964); Edgemont Coal & Cement Co. v. Gaylor, 100 Ohio App. 42, 133 N.E.2d 651
(1955). However, substantial compliance with the act, as by serving a copy of the
affidavit before it is filed, does not invalidate the lien. See Ulmer v. Portage Constr.
& Fin. Co., 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 257 (C.P. 1923), aff'd iuthout report, (Ohio Cr.
App.), motion to certify overruled, 24 OHIO L. REP. 322 (1925).
129 Gill v. Konvisser, 32 Ohio Ct. App. 542 (1914); Fisher v. Jacobs, 24 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 505 (C.P. 1920).
130 Schuholz v. Walker, 111 Ohio St. 308, 145 N.E. 537 (1924).
'
3
' OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.21.
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sonal service.'32 However, three alternatives to personal service are
provided by statute. Where the owner or others cannot be found
within the county where the property is located, valid service may be
effected by posting a copy of the affidavit in a conspicuous place"
on the premises within ten days after the expiration of the thirty-
day period. 3' The second alternative provides that the sheriff of
the county where the owner resides may effect service in any manner
and form acceptable in a civil action for money only.'35 Finally,
service may be made by registered letter to the last known place of
residence of the party to be served.'36 Proof of such registered mail
delivery is conclusive proof of service.' But it should be noted that
the lien claimant is required at his peril to ascertain the owner's last
known place of residence. 8
C. Preliminary Notice
Because the right to a lien is dependent upon the inclusion of
the claim in the statement and affidavit, provision is made whereby
a party furnishing materials or performing labor may notify the
owner of the omission of his claim by the contractor or subcontrac-
tor. 3 9 This provision is intended to provide an extra safeguard to
insure proper payment, the furnishing of such notice not being a
prerequisite to the attaching of a lien. 40 In addition, it informs the
owner of the identity of any parties the contractor or subcontractor
may have employed and allows him to take the necessary action to
protect himself against loss.
132 Crane Co. v. Koper Heating Co., 53 Ohio App. 403, 5 N.E.2d 338 (1936). The
court invalidated resident service, finding that since the legislature did not provide for
it, the court was without authority to read it into the statute. See also DEWITT § 175
(Holmes Supp. 1950).
133 Nailing a copy to a post on the land is sufficiently conspicuous. Baynes v. Mc-
Kee, 119 N.E.2d 122 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951).
13 4 OMo REv. CODE § 1311.07. It is the lien claimant's responsibility to deter-
mine the owner's location, and the lien is invalid if not properly served upon the owner
in possession of the land. Becker Plumbing Supply Co. v. Rialto Improvement Co., 36
Ohio App. 102, 172 N.E. 700 (1930).
135 OHIO REv. CODE § 1311.19. Under this section, service by publication would
be valid. See Crandall v. Irwin, 139 Ohio St. 253, 39 N.E.2d 608, aff'd on rehearing,
139 Ohio St. 463, 40 N.E.2d 933 (1942).
13 6 OmO REV. CODE § 1311.19.
137Ibid. Production of a return receipt would seemingly be sufficient, whereas a
mere conclusion based upon the custom or practice of service is not sufficient. Ma-
karius v. Hewitt, 16 Ohio L Abs. 130 (Ct. App. 1934).
138 Edgemont Coal & Cement Co. v. Gaylor, 100 Ohio App. 42, 133 N.B.2d 651
(1955).
'39 Ouso REV. CODE § 1311.05.
140 Mayer v. Nemeth, 11 Ohio App. 362 (1919).
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The notice must be written and must contain a description of the
labor performed and the material furnished either as of that date or
expected to be furnished in the future. A claim as to the amount
then due or to become due together with a description of the prem-
ises where such labor and materials were furnished, including the
street and number, must also be provided. The recommended form
for the notice is set out in the statute.'
The notice is sufficient if served at any time before final pay-
ment or distribution, and, upon such service, the party providing no-
tice is entitled to the same rights as if he had been included in the
affidavit of the contractor or subcontractor.'42 Because the owner is
thereupon bound just as if the claim were included in the state-
ments of the contractor or subcontractor, the risk of all payments
after service of the notice is upon the owner.'43 It is further pro-
vided that once payment is made the owner may rely upon the truth
and accuracy of the statements and is not liable for errors in or omis-
sions of names or amounts.144  However, where the owner makes
payment according to the statements and notices, he will not be
liable to any subcontractor, materialman, or laborer for any greater
amount than he contracted to pay the original contractor.145
V. PRIORITIES
It is obvious that the lienor is only interested in securing proper
payment for his labor and is thus prompted to invoke the procedures
discussed above to establish and perfect his right to a lien. How-
ever, as is often the case in actual practice, when the lienor seeks to
exercise that right against the owner, he is in competition with
other lienholders and secured creditors. Thus, the question of the
priority of one's lien right over that of others may determine the ex-
tent of any recovery.
A. Among and Between Mechanics' Lienors
Mechanics' liens are given a statutory priority over all other
titles, liens, or encumbrances to the premises which may be estab-
14 1 OHIo REv. CODE § 1311.05.
142 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 Chapel State Theatre Co. v. Hooper, 123 Ohio St. 322, 175 N.E. 450, aff'd per
curiam, 284 U.S. 588 (1931); Berea Block & Supply Co. v. Bridges, 178 N.E.2d 844
(Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
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lished subsequent to the commencement of any construction, excava-
tion, or improvement.146 It follows, therefore, that there would be
no priority over liens existing prior to such commencement. 4 7
Though the right has not been perfected by the filing of the required
statements and affidavits, the lien is considered to relate back to the
date the first labor was performed or first material furnished under
the general contract rather than ,that done under each separate con-
tract.14
8
Since all liens date back to the commencement of work, it is pro-
vided that there shall be no priority among the same class of lien-
holders on the same job.'49 This applies only where the claims
arise under the contract for the same improvement project, priority
not relating back to the commencement of some improvement unre-
lated to that project.' However, an exception is provided which
gives liens of manual laborers a priority to the extent of their labor
performed during the thirty-day period which precedes the date of
performance of the last labor.' 1
As between lien claimants of different classes from the same
work or project, the statute sets forth the priority of the parties.
The right of a subcontractor's lien precedes any lien taken or to be
taken by a principal contractor; and the right of a laborer, mechanic,
or materialman to a lien is superior to a contractor's or subcon-
tractor's lien, whether existing or still to be taken.'52
B. Mechanics' Lienors and Other Encumbrancers
(1) Construction Mortgages.-Prior to the Mechanic's Lien
Law of 1913, the right to a lien was given only to parties contract-
ing with the owner; hence, a mortgagee could readily identify lien
claimants against the property before the mortgage was recorded.
With this knowledge he would determine his course of action, usu-
ally paying off such claimants or obtaining a waiver of any lien
rights.'53 However, after 1913 any parties, without regard to priv-
14 6 OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.13 (B).
147 Neil v. Kinney, 11 Ohio St. 58 (1860).
148 OHio REv. CODE § 1311.13. Geer v. Tuggle, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 129 (C.P.
1919) (interpreting identical predecessor to OHIo REV. CODE § 1311.13); DEMAN
5 10.2.
149 OHIo REv. CODE § 1311.13(A).
150 Fryman v. McGhee, 108 Ohio App. 501, 163 N.E2d 63 (1958).
15 1 Omo REv. CODE 5 1311.13(A). Lake Lumber Co. v. Watson, 133 N.B.2d 925
(Ohio C.P. 1956).
152 Omo REV. CODE 5 1311.15.
153 DEWrrr § 219, at 343.
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ity, who performed labor or furnished materials would have a right
to a lien which related back to the beginning of construction. The
mortgagee would have no alternative but to take the mortgage sub-
ject to all claims arising before or after recording.' In order to
avoid such a harsh result and to promote credit financing, the mort-
gagee who furnishes money for the completion of an improvement
project after the rights of mechanics and materialmen have attached
is granted a statutory priority over all mechanics' liens filed after the
mortgage is recorded.'55
The right to the preference is qualified by requiring compliance
with specific conditions. First, the mortgage must be given and the
proceeds actually used to improve real estate or to eliminate prior
encumbrances or both. Second, the mortgage must contain the
correct name and address of the mortgagee. Lastly, it must contain
a covenant between the mortgagor and mortgagee authorizing the
mortgagee to do all things provided to be done by said mortgagee
under section 1311.14.156 It is to be noted that only a bona fide
mortgage is entitled to priority.'57 However, it is specifically pro-
vided that mortgages contemplated under this statute "shall be
liberally construed in favor of such mortgagees, a substantial compli-
ance by such mortgagees being sufficient."' 58
The establishment of priorities between mortgagees and lien-
holders has no bearing upon a mortgage filed for record before con-
struction has started,' and work or construction upon mortgaged
land will generally be subject to the security interest of such mort-
gages. Similarly, a mechanic's lien attaching prior to the recording
of a mortgage takes precedence over that mortgage. 60 Therefore,
the priority between a mechanic's lien and a mortgagee'6 ' is not de-
154 See Rider v. Crobaugh, 100 Ohio St. 88,125 N.E. 130 (1919).
155 OHIO REV. CODE § 1311.14.
156 See Ulmer v. Portage Constr. & Fin. Co., 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 257 (C.P. 1923),
aff'd without report, (Ohio Ct. App.), motion to certify overruled, 24 OHIo L. REP. 322
(1925).
157 Square Lumber Co. v. Goldman, 26 Ohio App. 130, 159 N.E. 130 (1926).
158 OHIo REv. CODE § 1311.14.
159 A. G. Sharp Lumber Co. v. Manus Homes, Inc., 189 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App.
1961).
16 0 Ulmer v. Portage Constr. & Fin. Co., 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 257 (C.P. 1923),
aff'd without report, (Ohio Ct. App.), motion to certify overruled, 24 OHIO L. REP.
322 (1925).
161 Other provisions of the statute dealing with specific problems are: (1) the op-
tion of the mortgagee to complete the loan or withdraw as well as the order in which
the mortgage fund must be distributed to entitle the mortgagee to the statutory pri-
ority; (2) the effect and application of payments made by the mortgagee; (3) notice to
the mortgagee by laborers and materialmen of the amounts due or to become due; and
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termined by the effective date between the parties thereto but rather
by the date of recording." 2
(2) Vendor's Lien.-The vendor's lien was a creature of
equity, founded upon the concept of an implied trust.' However,
it was a secret lien whereby the unpaid vendor, who clothed the
vendee with apparent title, could come forth and assert his superior
lien against a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer. 6 ' To obviate
the injustices that such a secretive right would create, Ohio has a
statutory vendor's lien 6 which provides security for that part of the
purchase money remaining unpaid. Thus, such a lien cannot arise
until after title to the property has been conveyed to the purchaser-
vendee. To cure the secrecy of the equitable lien, it is provided that
such lien is ineffective against a purchaser, mortgagee, judgment
creditor, or other encumbrancer' "unless there is a recital or a reser-
vation of the lien in the deed, or in some instrument of record
executed with the same formalities as are required for the execution
of deeds and mortgages of land.""' 7  While this particular lien is
now statutory, the principle of equitable liens is still present, as evi-
denced by the granting of such a right to a purchaser-vendee for the
amount paid on the purchase price where the vendor breached an
executory contract for sale of property.' 8
(3) Tax Liens.-It has been determined that a state or federal
tax lien has priority over a mechanic's lien. By statute,' the state
has a first lien for taxes and assessments upon the land and lots de-
scribed in the delinquent tax list.' Where a federal tax lien is in-
(4) requests by contractors, subcontractors, materialmen, and laborers for a statement
by the mortgagee. Omuo REV. CODE § 1311.14; 36 OHIO JUR. 2D Mechanics' Liens 5
118-19 (1959); DEMANN 55 10.7-.16; DEWITT 55 222-34.
162 Lake Lumber Co. v. Watson, 133 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio C.P. 1956); Bayless v. Viney,
21 Ohio L. Abs. 141 (Ct. App. 1935).
163 Smith v. Smith, 37 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941). The vendee was held
to be a trustee of the vendor, receiving the conveyance and holding it for the use of the
vendor until the purchase money was paid.
14See DEWITr 5 210(a), at 336; ROcKEL, MEcHANIcs' LIENS § 163 (1909).
165 113 Ohio Laws 61 (1929); OHio REV. CoDE 5 5301.26.
1 6 6 This language would seem to include all persons asserting a lien against property
and would thus include mechanics' liens. See DEWrIT 5 210(b), at 337.
167 OMo REV. CODE 5 5301.26.
16S Cleveland Trust Co. v. Bouse, 163 Ohio St. 392, 127 N.E.2d 7 (1955). The
court pointed out that other courts have found no equity in granting the right to one and
denying it to the other.
169 OHIo REv. CODE 5 5721.10.
170 Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Tyson, 133 Ohio St. 184, 12 N.E.2d 478 (1938)
(dictum). See also Ulmer v. Portage Constr. & Fin. Co., 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 257 (C.P.
1923), af'd without report, (Ohio Ct. App.), motion to certify overruled, 24 OMo L.
REP. 322 (1925).
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volved, state law controls the determination of the taxpayer's legal
interests in the property sought to be reached by such lien, and the
federal law will determine the priority of competing liens."' Thus
it has been determined that a federal tax lien will be accorded
priority over a mechanic's lien even though such lien has been per-
fected and suit instituted to foreclose the lien.
172
VI. CONCLUSION
The mechanic's lien is purely a statutory right created to provide
a security interest in real property to those persons who added to the
value of such property by their labor. This Note has been an objec-
tive explanation of the means which must be employed to establish
that statutory right, no attempt having been made to criticize any
single weakness or inequity. This does not mean that such defects
do not exist. Certainly the overall complexity of the statutes is sub-
ject to criticism. However, more importantly, it appears that the
basic purpose and intent of the mechanic's lien is at variance with
the means employed by the statutes. The initial right was directed
toward the large class of individual builders and laborers rather than
the large-scale contractors and labor unions which are now predomi-
nant. Upon careful examination it appears that the class of persons
benefited today renders the entire purpose of the statute subject to
question.
There is no doubt that the contractor, materialman, or la-
borer had a bona fide need for some protection at the outset of the
mechanic's lien legislation. The mid-nineteenth century economy
was on a small scale; indeed, the thrust of the Industrial Revo-
lution had not yet been felt. The economic society tended to-
ward a dichotomy of wealthy landowners and skilled artisans in con-
trast to today's vast middle class. This meant that thJe owner was in
a better position to assume the burden placed upon him by the lien
laws, and the worker had greater need for their benefits. Thus, the
potential liability of the landowner was not of so great a magnitude
as to result in financial destruction, and the worker depended upon
prompt payment for his day-to-day livelihood.
As the economy developed in the later nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, it became apparent that early lien laws were
171 Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); Geisinger v. East Ohio Gas
Co., 197 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
172 United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010, reversing 227 F.2d 359
(7th Cir. 1955). See also Short v. Peoples Bank, 105 Ohio App. 80, 151 N.E.2d 47
(1957).
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inadequate. Through numerous legislative alterations, varying ju-
dicial interpretations, and finally a constitutional amendment," 3 a
new Mechanic's Lien Act was drafted and enacted. However,
since 1915 there have been relatively few changes in Ohio's lien
laws. Certainly the economy and the needs of owners and workers
cannot be said to have remained static over this period.
The construction industry is big business today, and protection is
not required at all levels of the industry. The owner-artisan rela-
tionship has been replaced by the corporation which deals with
large contractors and trade unions. These groups need no protec-
tion, for both are well staffed with attorneys and command substan-
tial financial resources. In practice, the individual homeowner and
small businessman are those who are most affected by mechanic's
lien actions. They cannot afford to deal with the largest and most
reputable contractors, yet they are less able to assume the risk of a
dishonest contractor, and they are without the legal advice neces-
sary to comprehend the detailed and confusing statutory require-
ments. Can it not truly be said that this owner is the more innocent
of the two parties? It is time for a hard look at the existing statutes
and a reevaluation of the theory and purpose behind them. With
the advances and changes in the economy during this century and
those which may be expected in the future, a streamlining of exist-
ing statutes and a more equitable distribution of the risk of loss is
necessary." 5
Though the lienor was given a security interest to protect him-
self against default by the owner, the real problem was created in
the situation where the owner paid the contractor who in turn de-
faulted in payment to a subcontractor, materialman, or laborer.'
As between the unpaid laborer and the owner who had paid the con-
tractor, the equities balanced out in favor of the laborer, and thus
the owner bore a double liability for the contractor's default. This
choice has been justified by applying the theory of unjust enrich-
ment. However, it is absurd to believe that paying twice for a single
performance "enriches" the owner. How can the lienor claim a debt
owing when there is no debt between himself and the owner? Ab-
173 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 33.
3.7 103 Ohio Laws 369-79 (1913); 105 Ohio Laws 522-34 (1915).
175 In other spheres of the commercial world, the Uniform Commercial Code gov-
erns various transactions by rules which recognize the existing needs of the parties. The
stated purpose is "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law" and to recognize the cus-
tom and usages of commercial practice. UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102.
17 6 See Gosline, The Ohio Mechanics' Lien Law, 1 OHIo ST. I.J. 198, 204 (1935).
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sent the statute, the lienor's cause of action would be against the
contractor for breach of contract.
Since the right accorded the subcontractor, materialman, or la-
borer provides protection against a defaulting contractor, it ap-
pears that the remedy against the owner is misplaced. A more
equitable solution would be to place the loss on the guilty party.
Recognizing that there can be no remedy against an insolvent con-
tractor, preventive legislation offers a solution.'77 The method most
often employed in large scale construction to protect the owners
from loss is to require the contractor to execute an indemnity
bond which holds the owners harmless. If such a procedure were
statutory, the risk would be shifted to the guilty party rather than
the lesser of two innocent parties. The legislature could provide
that a surety bond would run with the contractor's license, in an
amount proportionate to his volume of business. While the cost
of the bond could be passed to the owner as a part of the contract
price, if the owner refused, a written waiver of the bond could
be required.
In addition, the premium to be paid the insurance company
would reflect the degree of honesty and solvency of the contractor.
The greater burden of such a system would thus fall upon the less
reputable contractor who causes the problem. Benefits would also
accrue to the honest contractor by the general upgrading of the in-
dustry and by the elimination of those whose unsound practices un-
dermine the public's confidence in contractors.
Whatever the solution, the need exists for change to benefit
not only owners and contractors but also the public as well. Legis-
lative attention should be focused on this too-long-forgotten area
of the law.
ROBERT D. MARKus
177 See Comment, 14 U. IA ILun L. Rsv. 73, 97 (1959).
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